Are the kidnappers of southern Philippines social bandits, criminal entrepreneurs, predatory political bosses, or a mixture of each? This case study looks at the evolution.
Most incidents of kidnappings during the Aquino regime (1986-1992) were in Mindanao, not in Manila, and the victims were mostly Filipino-Chinese businessmen in Central Mindanao (Hau, 2000: p.225, quoting Teresita Ang See in the Manila Chronicle, 19 November 1995).
It was Abogado Bago[1], the Moro rebel known as ‘Kumander Mubarak’, who is blamed by the police for starting the kidnapping trend in Central Mindanao in 1989. Bago is associated with a unit of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) called the National Security Command (NASCOM), which operated in Central Mindanao. The Army commander of the 35th Infantry Battalion in 1989, writing later in a blog of his memoirs, said that the NASCOM had a force of about 300 men and maintained a camp in the vicinity of Mt. Vitan and Igabay, near Buldon, Maguindanao [2].
One of Bago’s key assets was good communications with local politicians and the security services. In January 1990 after a local peace negotiating committee was ambushed in Buldon, Bago was the first to inform the local Army commander that his men were not involved, and that he had already retreated to Calanogas in Lanao del Sur to avoid a confrontation with retaliating Army forces. He further assured the Army commander that no rebel troops from the Lanao areas would be sent to reinforce other rebel groups in Buldon. Bago’s messages, said the Army commander, were brought to him by Sampiano Ogka, the mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur (Pagantihon blog).
Bago appears to have been avoiding a confrontation with government troops as he was already consolidating the infrastructure for his kidnapping operations. He needed to be able to move around quickly, and be constantly informed of military and police movements. The connections he built with local officials proved particularly indispensable. For the next three years, Bago was to prey on mostly Filipino-Chinese businessmen. His goal was solely the collection of ransom money – there is no evidence of Bago making political demands in any of his kidnapping operations.
By the time he was killed in a Marine-led raid on his hideout in Pantukan, Davao del Norte on December 7, 1992, Bago is believed to have organised 89 cases of kidnappings of wealthy Chinese-Filipinos – or roughly more than two kidnappings each month. He is thought to have raked in over PhP 130 million in ransom payments, or an average of PhP 1.46 million for each kidnapping (Philippine Star, 16 November 2001).[3]
The fact that the operation to get Bago involved the Philippine Marines is a story in itself. In March 1991, Armed Forces Chief Rodolfo Biazon confirmed widespread suspicions of military and police collusion in the kidnapping of Filipino-Chinese businessmen in Cotabato City (Manila Standard, 22 March 1991). In fact, one Army captain and three policemen by then have already been placed under ‘preventive custody’ and charged, while others were reassigned (Manila Standard, 22 March 1991). Through the months, the media reported more incidents of military and police involvement[4]. The marines, which had relatively cleaner record, were therefore needed to get Bago the biggest fish.
The momentum to capture Bago quickened towards the end of 1992. With the redeployment of Marine battalions in Central Mindanao, a manhunt codenamed ‘Operation Barefoot’ was launched (Manila Standard, 5 December 1992). On November 28, fighting broke out in Kabuntalan, Bago’s birthplace (Manila Standard, 1 December 1992). But he was hiding elsewhere – in the house of one his wives in Barangay Matiao, Pantukan, Davao del Norte. He was 29 when he was killed (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
In a 17 May 1991 interview by journalist Carolyn Arguillas, Maguindanao representative Michael Mastura sarcastically called the kidnappings a “corporate venture”, alluding that politicians, policemen, and the military were ‘incorporators’ behind-the-scenes in these ‘ventures’. He also called politicians mediating in kidnap cases as ‘negosyo-tors’[5] who would, for example, jack up a P500,000 ransom demand to P5 million, and then pocket the difference (Arguillas, 1991). This makes kidnapping much more difficult to deal with, as there are now powerful individuals who hold positions in government who ironically have an interest in disabling the capacity of state agencies so their ‘investments will grow’.
Bago’s killing[6] did little to stem the tide of kidnappings. It was not long after when his associates and followers – Faisal Marohombsar, Alonto Tahir, Mayangkang Saguile, Musa Ali and Samad Pandita (all former MNLF men) – took over and continued the venture in different groups collectively known as the Pentagon Gang. They would wreak havoc for the next decade.
Faisal Marohombsar rebranded the ‘corporate venture’. In radio interviews, he explicitly wanted to be known as a new Robin Hood. He took pains to make sure that the media gets the message that he was not anti-poor, and that government neglect was to blame ultimately for his emergence and continued predation as a kidnapper.
Marohombsar called himself ‘Mubarak the second’, born to a Maguindanao mother from Kabuntalan, the same town Bago came from, and to a Maranao father from Ganasi. (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002). He surrendered in the early 1980s to avail of the benefits of the rebel-returnee programme. But he soon was frustrated by unimplemented promises of livelihood projects to rehabilitate ex-combatants, and claimed that some of his followers were being forced by the government to be informants (Santos, et al., 2000: p. 394). He rejoined the MNLF, with NASCOM under Bago. When Bago started his kidnapping spree, Marohombsar acted as the group’s chief strategist, plotting the kidnappings from 1990 to 1992 (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002).
Marohombsar soon earned his desired ‘Robin Hood’ reputation. In southern Lanao, the ransoms he collected made him better resourced than most local governments. Muslim preachers in Malabang confirmed he paid for the repair of mosques and distributed livestock to poor communities surrounding his hideouts, making it easier for ordinary people to give him refuge and protection. Furthermore, his presence alone provided security to vulnerable villages. Marohombsar was described “a witty and ambitious man, who always looked forward to becoming popular” (Philippine Star, 26 August 2002, and information supplied by a former Maguindanao mayor).
Marohombsar continued a kidnapping career much longer than Bago’s. He survived the various Task Forces set up to hunt him[7]. But it was his expansion to Manila that led to his downfall. He was arrested in Quiapo in February 2002. Four months later, he escaped by walking out of his cell and taking a commercial flight back to Mindanao[8]. In August 2002, he went back to Manila but was cornered and eventually killed in Cavite by a small army of three anti-crime units (Rimban, 2003).
Another successor was Alonto Tahir[9], born in Barangay Cudal in Pagalungan, the strategic town in the Liguasan Marsh where various rivers converge, which is also the birthplace of former Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) chief Hashim Salamat. Tahir is believed to be a nephew of Salamat (Philippine Star, 16 August 2004). A battle-tested guerrilla, he used the name ‘Tigre’, and was easily identifiable from scars from fighting. He is said to have controlled a big force of men home grown in the Liguasan Marsh, and provided safe haven to escaping rebels and bandits, as well as hideouts for keeping hostages (Philippine Star, 29 November 2000)[10].
In 1999, a kidnapping in Digos City led to Tahir’s arrest, after his location was tipped off to pursuing army troops. Two hostages were killed, and charges were eventually filed by the surviving victims. The state prosecutor, Stewart Mariano, won the case at the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. In 2003, the court meted the death penalty on Tahir and his co-accused[11].
The penalty, however, could not be imposed as Tahir had by then already bolted the Sarangani provincial jail, along with 65 other inmates and his men. Police say that MILF rebels led by Tahir’s wife used rocket-propelled grenades to spring the prisoners from jail, on 7 November 2000. Guards as well as inmates were killed in the daring rescue. Tahir was quickly back in business. On 28 November 2000, a ransom note signed ‘Tigre’ was delivered to bank manager Florante Santiago, whose son was kidnapped in Marbel (Philippine Star, 29 Nov 2000).
Among those who escaped with Tahir was Abdul Basit Usman, a wanted militant said to have links with the Abu Sofia and Al-Khobar groups[12], and whose brother was a member of a religious committee of the MILF. The association with Usman brought Tahir into the wanted list of the US government, which then put a $1-million bounty on his head. Years later in January 2010, Usman was reported killed in a US drone attack in Waziristan, the mountainous tribal region in Pakistan (The Muslim Observer, quoting Philippine Daily Inquirer reports, 28 Jan 2010).
Like Marohombsar, Tahir played the role of Robin Hood. “He has that tradition of sharing with the community where he hides whatever he earns from his kidnapping activities. That practice made him difficult to find in areas where he has supporters,” said an unnamed Maguindanao mayor in a 2004 interview (Unson, Philippine Star, 16 Aug 2004). Shortly after, the military launched an operation to capture Tahir, keen on collecting the US bounty. His lair was bombarded and the military announced his killing, along with 17 followers. Less than a year later, he was sighted. Three policemen thereafter negotiated for his surrender, but were killed on their way back.
The authorities were never able to lay their hands on Tahir again. In September 2011, his relatives informed the military that he had passed away, due to complications from diabetes. He was buried in Sultan sa Barongis, protected to the very end by the community he embedded himself in (Sun Star Davao, 11 September 2011, and Philippine Star, 12 Sept 2011).
Samad Pandita is another key kidnapping figure in Central Mindanao, also known as Sammy Tilaka, a notorious figure who moved along the fringes of the MILF to take advantage of money-making opportunities. In March 2003, as heavy fighting raged between the Army and MILF troops in the Buliok complex[13], Pandita was busy distributing extortion letters to businessmen in General Santos City, demanding PhP15,000 each[14]. He carried a PhP1 million bounty on his head (Manila Bulletin, 13 March 2003).
A key associate of Pandita is Mayangkang Saguile aka Borongos, also with a PhP1-million bounty. Saguile operated in Cotabato City and in areas west of the Liguasan Marsh, where his kidnapping activities brought him into conflict with local warlords such as the Sinsuats of Upi. Saguile cultivated ties with the MILF, providing cover to some MILF operations, such as the takeover of Talayan municipality in January 2000. Both Pandita and Saguile remain at large.
In conclusion, this paper has argued that the kidnappings in Mindanao constitute a new form of predation that has complex political origins. Kidnapping is merely a mirror of the typical politics in the Philippines marked by power that is derivative and predatory.
[This was originally published in Lara and Schoofs, eds. (2013). Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao. This is one of three case studies in a chapter on kidnapping as a form of illicit economy.]
Endnotes:
[1] In some news reports, his name is given as Abogado Bago Salilaguia (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
[2] From “Memories of Buldon” in Ang Sisidlan, a blog by Dodong Pagantihon in http://yuehmegami.multiply.com/journal/item/21?&show_interstitial=1&u=%2Fjournal%2Fitem
[3]Cotabato-based journalist John Unson has tracked the career of the Pentagon group members. He filed various reports on Abogado Bago over the years, revising and updating his reports as he was able to gather and consolidate more information. His 16 November 2001 report quoted here is the latest of these reports on Bago: http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=140277&publicationSubCategoryId=67
[4] In November 1992, nine officers of the Army’s Intelligence Security Group (ISG) were arrested for kidnapping the wife of a Filipino-Chinese businessman in Sariaya, Quezon (Manila Standard,17 November 1992). Previously, members of the Galicia group, led by an Air Force sergeant and a Parañaque policeman, were similarly arrested in Tanauan, Batangas (Manila Standard, 13 October 1992).
[5] The term ‘negosyo-tors’ is a play on the words ‘negosyo’ (Tagalog for profit making) and ‘negotiator’, implying a hostage negotiator who is actually out to make money or earn a commission, rather than facilitate the speedy release of the victims.
[6] More details about Bago emerged after his death. Bago was said to have been the only survivor in a failed bank robbery in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia in 1982, where he worked as a contract worker. His group reportedly killed a young army officer and seven soldiers and took their high-powered rifles, which they then used in their first kidnapping – the abduction of Filipino-Chinese trader Lu Ela, whose family paid PhP 2 million for his release (Manila Standard, 8 December 1992).
[7] Ramos’ PACC operated mainly in Metro Manila. In Mindanao, anti-kidnapping operations were still handled by the military and the police, through task forces with names such as Task Force Kutawato or Task Force Tugis. Some of these task forces faced serious problems of coordination, especially from civilian authorities, given the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust. Some local officials, including a former central Mindanao mayor, hesitated to join these task forces for fear of being linked to who could be the real kidnapping masterminds.
[8] The PCIJ reported in 2003 that the best time for ‘big-time’ criminals to ‘escape’ from jail is during shake-ups within the PNP (see http://pcij.org/imag/PublicEye/jailbreaks.html). Marohombsar casually walked out of the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force’s maximum security detention cell in Camp Crame on June 19, 2002, a few days before Hermogenes Ebdane was to leave his post as deputy PNP director and NAKTAF chief and take over from PNP Director General Leandro Mendoza, who had been named secretary of transportation. Apparently, said other sources in Camp Crame, there had been tensions between Mendoza and Ebdane, and Marohombsar’s escape was ‘allowed’ as a way of embarrassing the incoming PNP chief.
[9] It should be noted that ‘Alonto’ is his first name, not his surname. Alonto Tahir is often mistaken to be a member of the Alonto clan of Lanao, an upper class Maranao family. He is actually an ethnic Maguindanaoan surnamed Tahir.
[10] Information on this was also gathered from Supreme Court resolution G.R. 177139. See http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/2011marchresolutions.php?id=101
[11] The source of this information is the blog ‘Spotlight on a Fellow Atenean’ by Jose Angelo Delos Trinos.
[12] According to Santos, et.al (2000), Abu Sofia and Al-Khobar are separate and distinct groups operating in central Mindanao. Abu Sofia has links with both MILF and Abu Sayyaf. Al-Khobar is into extortion, with the bombing of passenger buses as its ‘signature’ armed action. See p. 400-401 of Primed and Purposeful. http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SAS_ArmedGroups_HumanSecurityEfforts_Philippines.pdf
[13] The heavy fighting in Buliok resulted from an attempt of the MILF to take control of Hashim Salamat’s house, which was taken over by the 7th Marine Battalion Landing Team in fighting the previous month.
[14] The extortion letters came from the “Pentagon Allied Group Top-40 Special Bombing Operations” signed by ‘Commander Sammy Tilaka’. Another group Pandita created was called the “Dangerous 8”.
The Illicit Economist 
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